Basic Information
Axioms of Social Choice# May S Theorem, Common Voting Rules, Pagerank, Condorcet S Paradox and Arrow S Theorem. Voting Rules As Maximum-likelihood Estimators. Preference Structures# Single-peaked And Combinatorial Preferences, Generative Models With Ground Truth (placket-luce) and Without (urn). Strategic Voting# Gibbard-satterthwaite Theorem, Complexity Barriers And Vcg, Equilibrium Models, Heuristics, Iterative Voting And Convergence. Homework Will Be in The Python Programming Language. Learning Outcomes# At The End of The Course The Students# 1. Will Know to Understand The Conceptual, Computational, And Strategic Challenges of Aggregating Preferences. 2. Will Be Able to Spot Problems and Underlying Assumptions of Known And New Voting Mechanisms. 3. Will Be Able to Choose And/or Design an Appropriate Mechanism For Aggregating Preferences in Various Contexts.
Faculty: Data and Decision Sciences
|Undergraduate Studies
|Graduate Studies
Pre-required courses
(44268 - Int. to Data Structur and Algorithms and 104034 - Introduction to Probability H) or (94224 - Data Structures and Algorithms and 94411 - Probability (ie)) or (94224 - Data Structures and Algorithms and 94412 - Probability (advanced)) or (94226 - Introduction to Algorithms and 94411 - Probability (ie)) or (94412 - Probability (advanced) and 234247 - Algorithms 1) or (104222 - Probability Theory and 234247 - Algorithms 1) or (104222 - Probability Theory and 104291 - Combinatorial Algorithms)
Semestrial Information
Weekly Hours
2.5 Academic Credit • 2 Lecture Hours • 1 Discussion Hours
Responsible(s)
Reshef Meir
Registration Groups
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Weekly Hours
2.5 Academic Credit • 2 Lecture Hours • 1 Discussion Hours
Responsible(s)
Gili Bielous
Registration Groups
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Weekly Hours
2.5 Academic Credit • 2 Lecture Hours • 1 Discussion Hours
Responsible(s)
Reshef Meir
Registration Groups
|
|
|
|